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Chapter 1: Introduction 
China, as well as the rest of the world, is enthusiastically involved in the trend of 
integrating social media in every aspect of people’s lives.  Online BBS, blogs, Renren 
(the equivalent of facebook), Tencent and Weibo are gradually becoming essential parts 
of people’s daily activities.  It is reported that about 54.7 percent of Chinese Internet 
users own or visit blogs, and 47.3 percent of Internet users in China have at least one 
account on a social networking site (Fenn, 2011).  Over 25 percent post more than 10 
pieces of information on social networks everyday, and 92.3 percent of Chinese Internet 
users claim that they visit social networking pages at least three times a week.  In 
addition, according to the Statistic Report on the Internet Development in China released 
in January 2012, among the 500 million Internet users in China, half of them own a 
microblog account, and the participation rate in microblogs has increased by 34.9 percent 
in 2011 as compared to 2010.  
 Microblog is an online social network platform that allows users to post short 
messages to friends and followers.  Users receive immediate, aggregated updates on 
activities, opinions and statuses of the people they followed by logging into their 
accounts.  Twitter is currently the most popular microblog platform worldwide with 145 
million users, and it was accessible in China until 2009, when the Chinese government 
banned it.  Sina.com then launched its own microblog platform, known as Sina Weibo in 
August 2009, and it soon became the dominating microblog platform in China.  By the 
end of March 2012, Weibo had attracted 324 million registered users and the number is 
consistently growing.  
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Sina Weibo has many similar features with Twitter, such as sending 140 
characters per message, searching topics, trending topics and so on. It also has some 
distinct features and functions of its own.  Weibo aggregates some functions of 
Facebook, such as uploading videos, playing games, establishing private conversations, 
the “like” button and so on.  In addition, Weibo has launched more than 1,600 
applications that allow users to play games, initiate voting, listen to and share music and 
even share documents.  The short messages on Weibo are also more informative than the 
messages on Twitter, since 140 Chinese characters contain richer content than 140 
characters in English.  As Ai Weiwei observed, “in Chinese language, 140 characters is a 
novella”(Ambrozy, 2011:241).  The commenting and retweeting functions are also 
slightly different from Twitter, as Weibo “allows threaded comments on feeds, seen 
under the original messages and not broadcast to the user’s followers” (Yu L et al., 2011).  
In addition, various kinds of Weibo “medals” are offered in order to encourage users to 
post more messages and interact with other users.  Sina Weibo also distinguishes itself by 
enabling verified users, whose profiles are verified with the person’s real social identity.  
Most of the verified users are elites, professionals and celebrities as well as some 
governmental accounts or organizational profiles. 
 With the continuously increasing prevalence of Weibo, it has gradually become 
an important platform for not only individual expression of opinions, but also a virtual 
public sphere (Papacharissi, 2002) for various kinds of discussions.  Among all these 
users, there are groups of people who always initiate or lead discussions, and play 
essential parts in other people’s decision-making process, and we call them opinion 
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leaders.  Opinion leaders on Weibo are extremely active and influential, and their use of 
Weibo always exerts influence on other people’s information consumption and 
interactive communication on Weibo.  
In this research paper, these opinion leaders’ use of Weibo is analyzed to see the 
pattern of their online behaviors, and to see if gender and fields of expertise will affect 
opinion leaders’ use of Weibo.  The study will help people to better understand how 
opinion leaders in China use Weibo for their daily information consumption and 
communication, and will give us suggestive answers to the question of how to use Weibo 
to spread information effectively.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Opinion leaders 
The concept of opinion leaders is broadly defined as the people who can influence 
others.  In The People’s Choice, the authors found out that “in every area and for every 
public issue there are certain people who are most concerned about the issue as well as 
most articulate about it”, and they defined them as opinion leaders.  In their study, they 
conceptualized “opinion leaders” by asking people “have you tried to convince anyone of 
your political ideas recently?” and “has anyone asked your advice on a political question 
recently” (Lazarsfeld, 1944).  Katz and Lazarsfeld further refined this concept, by 
explaining that opinion leaders are not identical to what we thought to be traditional 
influencers; rather, they are distributed throughout “all occupational groups and on every 
social and economic level”(Katz, 1955).  Weimann (1994) identified opinion leaders 
from the opposite angle: an opinion leader is not an authoritative, charismatic or leading 
figure but rather an expert among his or her peers, a source of advice on a particular issue 
or subject.  
How these opinion leaders exert their influence was also discussed, and a “two-
step flow of communication” was developed to describe the information flow in 
interpersonal relations.  The “two-step flow of communication” suggested that ideas and 
information always flow from radio and print to opinion leaders, and opinion leaders then 
transmit them to a larger population who were less active in information seeking and 
absorbing (Katz, 1955).  The relationship between opinion leaders and the mass 
population was also clarified, that the give-and-take relationship is an integral part of 
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people’s everyday life, and opinion leaders play a key role in interpersonal relations and 
potential networks of communication (Katz, 1955).  
Katz (1957) further suggested the factors that influence the formation of opinion 
leadership within certain groups: 1) the personification of certain values (who one is); 2) 
competence (what one knows) and 3) strategic social location (whom one knows).  He 
also pointed out that opinion leadership is more than an interpersonal channel of 
communication; it is also a source of social pressure and social support.  Katz clearly 
identified an opinion leader as an informer and a persuader (Rhee et al., 2007).  
Weimann (1991) suggested “the identification of the ‘influentials’ should be 
related to the concept of opinion leaders.”  He claimed that identifying influentials, 
validating the measurement by “external” criteria and pointing to the role of these 
influentials in the flow of interpersonal communication influence the original idea of 
opinion leadership.  
Weimann also believed that an opinion leader has certain specific characteristics.  
He believed that opinion leaders possess certain personal traits, such as intelligence 
superiority, knowledgeability and interests in certain issues, early adoption of innovations 
and risky preference as well as conformity village norms.  Opinion leaders also share 
similar social attributes. For example, they are always socially active and gregarious.  
Opinion leaders are also the center of their social networks and are easily accessible, and 
they are often not only the well informed, but socially recognized by the public.  On the 
social––demographic level, they have dynamic profiles that change along within different 
domains, cultures, societies and in different times.   
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Opinion leaders on the Internet/on Weibo 
The literature concerning opinion leaders on the Internet is not abundant, but there 
are some significant articles about the definition and characteristics of opinion leaders in 
cyberspace.  Rhee et al. (2007) adopted Weimann’s idea that “influential” is essential in 
defining opinion leaders, and they asserted that opinion leaders are the people who exert 
influence on other people’s opinions by giving out their personal opinions.  This is 
confirmed by the InfluenceRank test, which shows that opinion leaders online are “those 
who bring in new information, ideas, and opinions” on their blogs, and those people also 
carried higher influence in the network. (Song et al., 2007) 
Chadwick (2006) suggests that the Internet has made the formation of political 
opinions more complex: “much of what goes on in cyberspace is talk.  Hundreds of 
thousands of forums have sprung up, in which people in their diverse identities can 
argue, compete, collaborate, or simply share thoughts”.   Donatella Campus (2012) 
agreed, and believed that the focus of attention on the inter-dependence of the formation 
of political opinions has been redirected by the advent of new media.  
Chadwick further introduced a concept that is similar to opinion leaders, that on 
the Internet, it is “switchers” who control the connecting points in information flow 
(Arsenault and Castells, 2008).  According to them, switchers are the “networks of actors 
engaging in dynamic interfaces that operate specifically in each particular connection 
process” and switchers are the ones who facilitate the performance of the programs.  
	  7	  	  
There are contradictory theories about the differences between traditional opinion 
leaders and online opinion leaders.  Some believe that online opinion leaders should not 
be entirely different from off-line leaders, since they are the people who “share some 
dispositional characteristics that will lead to active participation in conversation and 
massive consumption in informational media”; while others say online opinion leaders 
should be distinctive if “opinion leaders are indeed characterized by the positions in the 
social networks as well as media patterns”.  Therefore, since the Internet is a different 
social network with different media platforms, online opinion leaders should be 
distinctive (Rhee et al., 2007). 
Rhee et al. elaborated on the characteristics of online opinion leaders: Online 
opinion leaders are more likely to read other participants’ messages, to write aggressive 
messages, to participate in Internet discussions and to show the highest communication 
competence.  They also have a greater ability to influence others as well as to be 
empathetic to others.  They are also more politically liberal compared with other Internet 
users.  
                In addition to this literature about opinion leaders on the Internet, Chinese 
scholars and research institutions have also looked into the issue of opinion leaders on the 
Internet, especially on Weibo.  In a research report released in May 2012, the Public 
Opinion & Communication Center of Fudan University and PubTopic.org published their 
rankings of top opinion leaders on Weibo specified by gender, age and fields of expertise.  
According to the report, there are some important and interesting characteristics of 
opinion leaders on Weibo: 1. Generally males dominate the top 100 opinion leaders, as 
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males comprise 91 percent of the top 100 opinion leaders; 2. The middle-aged (born 
between 1960 - 1980) is the main age group, taking 72 percent of the top 100; 3. 
Businessmen, writers, scholars and media practitioners are the dominant opinion leaders 
on Weibo, with 17 percent, 20 percent, 26 percent and 33 percent, respectively.  This 
report gives us some primary results about opinion leaders on Weibo, but it fails to 
provide more detailed research methods and in-depth analysis. However, the findings are 
still valuable and informative.  
Agenda-setting theory in the digital age  
Agenda-setting theory, born in an era when traditional media was the dominant 
power in content creation and dissemination (Luo, 2012), suggests that the media has the 
power to set the agenda for social attention and public opinions on key public issues 
(Zhang et al., 2011; McCombs & Shaw, 1972). After McCombs and Shaw’s (1972) study 
demonstrating the strong correlation between the public’s opinions on significant election 
issues and key political issues reported on local and national levels, a series of studies 
have focused on the role of media in shaping the public’s mind in different settings and 
around different social issues (McCombs, 2005). Traditionally, the relationship between 
media agenda and the public agenda was described as unidirectional, meaning the public 
could only receive information passively without the ability to communicate back to the 
media (Rosen, 2006, Luo, 2012). However, existing literature has also addressed the 
factors that may influence media agenda setting. Brousius and Kepplinger (1990) 
discovered that agenda setting effects were most prominent during intense coverage and 
when there was a significant difference between media converge and mouth-to-mouth 
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information (Roberts, Wanta & Dzwo, 2002). Another study also showed that when 
conversations and media coverage overlapped, interpersonal communication could 
bolster media agenda setting effects (Wanta & Hu, 1993).  
The emergence of new media has dramatically changed the traditional media 
landscape with the introduction of various channels that allow the public to disseminate 
their own opinions and ideas to a broader public, while traditional media is no longer the 
only dominant power or the sole outlet for content creation and distribution (Meraz, 
2009). In fact, some scholars predicted that the digital age is the end of agenda setting 
when “audiences fragment and virtually everyone has a unique external media agenda 
that is a highly individualized composite constructed from this vast wealth of online news 
and information” (McCombs, 2005). Such radical change, according to McCombs 
(2005), assumes a high heterogeneity of media agendas and public attentions, which 
would be almost the sheer opposite of the past when media agendas and public attentions 
were highly homogeneous.  
Such predictions not only envision the future of agenda setting theory, they also 
imply the possibility and capability of influential alternative, online channels for setting 
agenda for public attention, including opinion leaders as discussed in this study.  In light 
of these concerns and predictions, many scholars have investigated how digital media has 
changed the traditional agenda setting landscape. Roberts, Wanta and Dzwo (2002) 
looked into the agenda setting and issue salience on electronic bulletin boards and found 
that in the context of immigration, health care and taxes issues, the media still had 
apparent agenda setting influence on online discussions, except for abortion issues. Their 
	  10	  	  
study proved that media coverage is still providing information and materials for 
individuals to discuss on online platform. Lee et al. (2006) also investigated how online 
bulletin boards impact newspaper coverage in the context of South Korea’s general 
election in 2000. This study found that newspapers could still influence online discussion 
at the first level of agenda setting, while significant correlation showed that online 
bulletin boards was influencing newspaper coverage on the second level of agenda 
setting, though with few reciprocal time spans. These findings have strong implications 
with respect to the power of the Internet in setting the public agenda and affecting the 
media agenda. Meraz (2009) also conducted a study to test agenda-setting theory in the 
context of political blogs. The study questioned the elite, traditional media’s agenda 
setting and social influence on independent political blogs and newsroom blogs, and 
suggested that traditional media, though still playing a role in influencing the public, has 
lost its singular position in affecting the public attention; blogs were gaining power in 
content creation and distribution. More importantly, blogs were giving citizens more 
power and influence in setting media agendas; instead of letting media set the agenda for 
the citizens.  
The development of online media and the drastic changes it brought to traditional 
agenda-setting theory may suggest an even more radical and fundamental changes in the 
media atmosphere in China, where the Communist Party enforces strict censorship over 
the media for the purpose of controlling the public agenda, or to “guide public opinion” 
(Dai, 1999). Such governmental control over mass media has effectively served the 
Party’s goal of managing positive propaganda that fits the Party’s ideologies and beliefs 
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(Li, Qin & Kluver, 2003; Luo, 2012).  
Researchers in China have investigated agenda-setting theory from a number of 
different viewpoints. For example, Zhang et al. (2011) conducted a study testing the 
relationship between the Chinese people’s personal agenda setting, social agenda setting 
and the Chinese media’s agenda setting. A telephone survey revealed that Chinese 
citizens had clearly distinguished important personal issues and important national issues, 
while there was a positive correlation between the Chinese media’s agenda setting and 
individual feelings regarding important national issues. However, such correlation did not 
exist with respect to individuals’ feelings on personal issues. The researchers concluded 
that the agenda-setting effects partly-existed in China, and argued that there was a 
substantial variance between peoples’ personal agendas and the social agenda in a 
socialist nation.  
Studies have also looked into the power of the Internet in changing the previous 
media agenda setting in China.  Although the Chinese government tried to enforce strict 
censorship online, known as the “Great Firewall” (Chung, 2008), the ephemerality and 
anonymousness of Internet communication made it almost impossible for the government 
to gain total control (Qiang, 2010).  
According to Qiang (2007), the Internet offered a free and fast flow of 
information for the public to consume, and it also provided a public sphere for Internet 
users to articulate and amplify their opinions. The situation in China reflects the fact that 
the public’s reliance on traditional media has been reduced by the emergence of the 
Internet and, consequently, the government’s censorship ability, and hence traditional 
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media’s ability to shape the public agenda has diminished (Luo, 2012). The Internet also 
has a reciprocal effect on traditional media by offering alternative information sources, 
apprising media message, elaborating, questioning or revising their opinions via 
interpersonal communication (Sotirovic & Mcleod, 2001).  
Scholars in China have also explored how digital media has challenged the 
traditional mass media landscape in China, and how the Internet could affect the 
government and traditional media’s agenda-setting power among the public. Ou (2004) 
mentioned that Chinese Internet users had an unprecedented power over public opinion, 
in that “if all netizens yell together, there would be three earthquakes in China” (cited in 
Zhou & Moy, 2007, p. 80). An online survey conducted by People’s Daily, Chinese 
National School of Administration and Renmin University also showed that 69% of 
Chinese Internet users believe in enhancing China’s democracy via the Internet, and 
public opinion online serves as an effective representation of the public mood (People’s 
Daily Online, 2009). These studies suggest that the overall potential for online public 
opinions to affect traditional media agenda setting is substantial, and hence, the 
increasing power of opinion leaders online in impacting the public opinions.  
Empirical research has also centered on the interplay between online public 
opinion and media agenda setting in China.  Li and Qin (2001) conducted a study that 
examined the relationship between online posts and media coverage in the case of the 
1999 China-U.S. aircraft collision, and by comparing the coverage of People’s Daily and 
Qiangguo Forum, a popular BBS in China, the researchers found that there were 
significant incongruences between what was reported by the media and what was 
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discussed online. Their findings suggested that the traditional media’s role in setting the 
public attention has been challenged by the Internet, and the Internet could “pose a 
significant threat to the government-controlled media by revising and reconstructing the 
agenda set by the Chinese official press” (Li, Qin & Kliver, 2003, p. 143, also see Luo, 
2012).  
Zhou and Moy (2007) also looked into agenda-setting issues in the context of new 
media. They found that online public opinion is extremely helpful in amplifying the 
influence of a local event and escalating it into a national issue. Heated online discussions 
of a small event can bring new values to the event, gather online and offline attention, 
and eventually upgrade a small event to a prominent issue and attract the traditional 
media’s attention as well as coverage. This study also found a strong, positive correlation 
between Internet users’ enthusiasm in online discussions and traditional media’s coverage 
intensity, which reveals the power of online public opinions in interacting with traditional 
media’s agenda setting. The researchers also argued that, instead of controlling, the 
government acted as an intervening force, while at the same time, the government’s 
decision-making could also be altered by the interaction of online public opinion and 
media agenda setting.  
These studies not only demonstrated that the Internet has the ability to interfere 
with traditional media agenda setting, and hence the government’s decision-making, they 
also implied that public opinions online in China have a very distinctive role to play in 
challenging the deeply-rooted tradition of governmental censorship in China, and to 
promote the development of democracy in China. Opinion leaders, consequently, are 
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critical to online public opinion formation and dissemination.  
Gatekeeping process on the Internet  
The massive amount of information and unprecedented impact opinion leaders 
possess on the Internet may also indicate their capability to influence what information is 
published online. According to Meraz and Papacharissi (2013), the gatekeeping process 
on the Internet has changed, and the media is no longer the only gatekeeper. A 
crowdsourced group of elites, instead, gradually assumed the responsibility for 
information verification and distribution. Thus, opinion leaders’ activities and 
performance on the Internet may also be viewed and understood within gatekeeping 
theory.  
 The concept of gatekeeping originated in the food consumption industry when 
Lewin (1947; also see in Showmaker et al., 2011) used this concept to illustrate how food 
items came to the family table after passing through different “gates”. Although this 
concept was not considered in mass communication, Lewin suggested that the process of 
selecting “items” could also be applied to the field of journalism, as White (1950, also 
see in Shoemaker et al., 2011) quickly picked up this idea to show how news stories were 
published by several editorial decisions that acted as the “gates” (Shoemaker et al., 2011).  
In mass communication, gatekeeping theory describes the process of how 
potential information and news are “winnowed, shaped and prodded” into news ready to 
be published by the media (Shoemaker et al., 2011). It is also broadly seen as “the overall 
process through which the social reality transmitted by the news media is constructed” 
with a series of comprehensive decisions (Shoemaker et al., 2011), and this concept was 
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also expanded to describe not only individuals or groups, those of whom were 
traditionally defined as gatekeepers, but also to routines, codes of conduct and algorithms 
(Showmaker et al., 2001; Showmaker, Vos, & Reese, 2009; Coddington & Holton, 
2013).  For years, there have been fruitful studies centered on applying gatekeeping 
theory to traditional media, however, the continued validity and relevance of this concept 
has been challenged in the new media era.  
Opinions concerning gatekeeping concept in the new media environment vary. 
Some argue that gatekeeping still plays a major role in online media production, and that 
the traditional gatekeeping process is conducted online in a manner similar to that which 
occurs in the physical newsroom (Boczkowski, 2004; Goode, 2009; Livingston & 
Bennett, 2003). Others claim that the media’s gatekeeping role has been threatened and 
weakened due to the openness of the Internet (Bowman & Willis, 2003; Gillmor, 2004). 
Willaims and DelliCarpini (2000) even suggest that the challenge brought by the digital 
media environment “undermines the idea that there are discrete gates through which 
political information passes: if there are no gates, there can be no gatekeeper” (p. 62).  
Although the gatekeeping concept remains controversial in the digital age, many 
studies have begun to apply this concept to the new trends in mass communication and 
journalism practice. Some scholars have looked into how gatekeeping theory was 
exercised in the online news production process. Harrison (2009) conducted an 
observational study to investigate how the BBC dealt with user-generated content (UGC), 
and identified four different types of UGC. Harrison also found that the traditional 
gatekeeping process had evolved to adapt to the new media environment, with its original 
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goal being to maintain the BBC’s core news values by routinely moderating the UGC on 
the BBC hub. He also cited the BBC’s guidelines, which indicates how the gatekeeping 
process was practiced with respect to the audience’s online participation: ‘‘[e]very online 
space where user generated content is published must have someone editorially 
responsible for that content and should have a host to provide a visible and active 
presence and a moderator who can remove illegal or inappropriate content’’ (BBC Online 
Services Guidelines, 2005). Domingo et al. (2008) found that, although citizen journalism 
has been increasingly popular in cyberspace, UGC is still subject to traditional 
gatekeeping regimens when this content is picked up by traditional media. Such findings 
are in line with Karlsson’s (2011) study, which theorized that even though traditional 
journalism is gradually allowing more UGC to be published, such content is also 
restrained by traditional media’s gatekeeping processes, and only the content that fits the 
news institutions’ traditional values will be selected for publication. Through a series of 
interviews, Hermida and Thurman (2008) concluded that in news institutions, such as The 
Times, editors preferred to include only the UGC that “fit their brand” (p. 350); content 
that didn’t live up to the organization’s or the audience’s standards and values was 
filtered out, and this filtering process, also known as the gatekeeping process, also existed 
in television stations. Singer (2005) also noted that since UGC was largely used by 
traditional media to improve their coverage, online content was adapted to fit the 
standards and values of traditional media. Ali and Fahmy (2013) probed into the problem 
of UGC and gatekeeping theory through three major conflicts in Iran, Egypt and Libya, 
and found that even though social media helped to reach the hard-to-reach audience, their 
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influence on these three revolutions was limited, and traditional media’s role of 
gatekeeper was still exercised with respect to citizen journalism, and this gatekeeping 
function was critical, especially in conflict zones.  
Although the prior literature suggests that the traditional gatekeeping process 
persists even in the digital age, studies also show that new media has brought changes to 
this filtering process. Traditional media is experiencing a loss in its power to control what 
to publish, and is adapting a new gatekeeping process because the online environment 
permits little interference with respect to what people can publish online (Stromer-Galley, 
2004; Williams et al., 2005). Cassidy (2006) also conducted a survey to see how the 
Internet affected journalism, and found that even though 89 percent of online editors 
believed that online and offline journalism should share the same journalistic ethics and 
standards, the reality was that almost half (47%) of them admitted that they actually spent 
less time on fact-checking and verification before publishing a story online, because 
online journalism requires fast speed when publishing a story. 30 percent of the online 
editors who participated in the survey reported that it is not likely that an online 
newspaper will follow the same standards and ethics as print journalism.  
Such discussions were expanded to j-blogs, and Singer (2006) suggested that the 
role of journalists has changed in the new media environment. Instead of being the 
gatekeepers, journalists are the sense-makers, promoting the journalistic values and ethics 
they follow.  Bruns (2008) hence argued that journalists have become the gate-watchers 
who observe the gate, rather than keeping the gate, in the online news industry.  Few 
studies have specifically investigated j-blogs to see how that help shaped the new 
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gatekeeping process.  Yu (2011) concluded that j-blogging “represents an experiment of 
amateur journalism by professional journalists in the blogosphere”, and “the creativity in 
gate-watching, gate-poking and gate-mocking” is practiced through the feedback loop of 
the blogosphere.  Yu argued that the meditated loop, in which ideas, visions, emotions 
and beliefs can be tested, was crucial.  Yetaai (2007) suggested that even though 
censorship still existed in China, blogs and j-blogs could still provide a more transparent 
and communicative platform for the Chinese (Gao & Martin-Kratzer, 2011).  It has also 
been suggested that blogs offer a public sphere that can enlarge and evolve public 
discourse, thus blogs can stimulate media and social evolution in China (MacKinnon, 
2008).  Gao and Martin-Kratzer (2011) also explored j-blogs in China, and found that in 
the digital age, journalists were no longer the sole gatekeeper; Internet users could also 
perform the role of gatekeeper, and J-blogs as an innovative new media product can help 
Internet users gain more knowledge of gatekeeping by enabling direct communication 
between readers and journalists, and training readers to be proactive, and even news co-
producers.  Singer (2014) agreed, and even argued that, as to online content, Internet 
users, rather than passively consuming information, have become the secondary 
gatekeepers. According to Singer, this role includes “assessment of contributions by other 
users; communication of the perceived value or quality of user-and journalist- produced 
content, and selective re-dissemination of that content”.  Thus, the previous one-way, top-
down gatekeeping process (Barzilai-Nahon, 2009) has been replaced by a two-step 
process, and initial editorial decisions can be mediated by users’ decisions when selecting 
what news to report, and how visible the news should be.   
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The existing literature concerning the gatekeeping concept in the new media 
environment has also expanded to discuss how the Internet changed the mechanisms for 
gatekeeping from a different angle.  Bastos et al. (2013) argued that the concept of 
gatekeeping is built upon the mechanism that prevented information sharing on a larger 
network.  The scarce and expensive resources and high cost of production and 
distribution in the traditional media era also helped keep information in a centered 
network, so that editorial decisions were made in small groups.  However, in the digital 
age, this communication infrastructure has changed.  The traditional sender-to-receiver 
distribution process has been challenged, and even information once filtered out by 
gatekeepers could later be disseminated, or even skip the gates entirely to be published 
online.  Bastors and colleagues (2013) then concluded that the previous gatekeeping 
concept based on source-destination was insufficient to describe the new mechanism.  
Literatures have also discussed how the gatekeeping process was practiced in the 
context of social media, specifically on Twitter, the platform adopted by Weibo.  
According to Suh et al. (2010), a profile’s number of followers is significantly related to 
the number of retweets the profile could receive, which also implies opinion leaders’ 
massive influence on social media.  Based on this conclusion, it was argued that social 
media, for example Twitter, challenged the traditional gatekeeping concept, because 
instead of receiving information from the professional, traditional media, people consume 
information from “a plethora of distinct sources”, and a study has shown that tweets 
directly from mass media channels only comprise 15% of the tweets ordinary Internet 
users receive (Wu et al., 2011).  What makes the gatekeeping process appear even more 
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insufficient is the data suggesting that almost 50% of all attention on Twitter is generated 
by less than 0.05% of users (Wu et al., 2011), and Bastors et al. (2013) concluded that 
those elites online now have assumed the role of gatekeeper.  Bastors et al. also suggested 
that gatekeeping online is “shaped by a number of actions and channeling routines that 
are reliant not only upon network connectivity, but also upon message fitness”.  Meraz 
and Papacharissi (2013) also investigated the gatekeeping concept in Twitter, and found 
that a crowdsourced group of elites are the new gatekeepers on Twitter, and influential, 
central figures not only promoted, but also spread elite influence through vast numbers of 
retweets and mentions, and these crowdsourced groups of elites filter, collaborate, share, 
and spread information on social media.  Meraz and Papacharissi thus concluded that 
there is a new, symbiotic interrelationship between the online elites and the ordinary, 
such that the crowdsourced nonelites can also be active participants in deciding what can 
be viral online.  
               However, very few studies have looked into how opinion leaders utilize the 
Internet, and to be specific, Weibo, one of the most popular social networks in China, and 
their potential agenda-setting effects and the possible role of gatekeepers on Weibo 
remain unknown.  Thus, this research first focuses on the general picture of opinion 
leaders use of Weibo with the following questions:  
RQ1: In what ways do opinion leaders receive and spread information on Weibo. 
RQ2. What kind of information do they prefer to receive and spread on Weibo. 
Gender Differences and Internet Use 
 Online gender difference refers to the differences between women and men with 
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respect to Internet use, (Fountain, 2000, Fullerm 2004, Haro and Tremayne, 2006) and 
there were many researches about different Internet usage between males and females.  
Although reports show that men still dominate the online world (Gavin et al., 2007), it is 
undeniable that the Internet provides an advantageous platform for females.  
Furthermore, the gap between female and male Internet use is narrowing. Schumacher 
and Morahan-Martin (2001) found that females have gained more experience with the 
Internet, and that there was more content that catered to women’s interests online.  The 
Internet is especially helpful for those women who are considered inferior to men in 
traditional life.  For example, Mitra (2004) contended that the Internet made it possible 
for women in South Asia to be heard worldwide, and Harcourt (2000) believed that the 
Internet helped Arabic women express themselves in an open platform.  
 It has been demonstrated that there are some different patterns in Internet usage 
between men and women.  Jackson found that women used the Internet more as a tool for 
communication, while men used it more for information seeking (Jackson et al., 2001).  
And Lim and Meier (2011) found that in Korea, boys typically spent time on the Internet 
to play games and meet friends, while girls were more likely to spend their time 
managing social relationships and updating their own sites in the virtual world.  
Thompson et al. studied the gender difference in Facebook use, and discovered that 
females reported more emotional factors in their use of Facebook, while that percentage 
was 5% less in male users (Thompson et al., 2012).   
 These findings are consistent with the conclusion that female Internet use is 
centered around their private lives, such as home, family, private relations and so on, and 
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women are more likely to bring up topics that lead to gossip about themselves on 
Facebook (Walker, Cohen, Sibbald, 2008), while males focused more on external life, 
such as politics, the government and commercial establishments (Fuller, 2004; Witte and 
Frank, 2005).  Female users were proven to be milder than male users, as they exhibit 
more conformity than men (Rosander, Michael, Eriksson, Oskar, 2012, Bond & Smith, 
1996).  Similarly, as Ogan et al. found, women were less inclined to express political 
opinions, and had a less authoritative manner in their online conversations (Ogan et al., 
2005).  They are more likely to agree with others, and show support, while men are more 
likely to respond negatively than women (Guiller, Durndell, 2007).  Zhang et al. (2011) 
researched the gender difference in language use on web forums, and found out that 
females are more likely to talk about family members, God, peace, marriage and good 
will, while males are more interested in discussing extremism, holy men and beliefs.   
 Previous researches give us clear hints about the gender disparity on the Internet, 
but literature about the gender difference in Chinese microblogs is limited, and there are 
very few researches about the gender disparity in Chinese opinion leaders on the Internet.  
Thus, one of the purposes of this research is to look for possible opinion leaders’ gender 
differences in their usage of Weibo.  Specifically, the research is going to seek potential 
answers regarding whether: 
H1:  There are gender disparities in the externality of the issues posted by opinion 
leaders.  
H2: There are gender disparities in the aggressiveness of the tweets posted by 
opinion leaders.  
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Fields of expertise and Internet use 
 In addition, it has been proven that in persuasive communication, the source’s 
expertise is one of the positive determining factors for how influential the information 
may be.  According to Petty and Cacioppo (1986), source expertise refers to a source’s 
ability to provide professional information on a specific field to an information receiver, 
and a higher level of expertise confers higher trustworthiness.  Liu et al. further proved 
this theory, and contended that source expertise has a positive effect on information 
retweeting, and information provided by high expert users is more likely to be retweeted 
(Liu et al., 2012).  This research paper is also going to test how applicable this theory is 
with respect to opinion leaders’ use of Weibo by attempting to determine whether: 
H3: Information and opinions within their field of expertise are more popular than 
information and opinions outside of their field of expertise 
H4: Opinion leaders are more likely to interact with followers about topics within 
their field of expertise 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
                This research used both qualitative and quantitative methods.  The samples for 
the qualitative and quantitative part are the same, and two constructed weeks in January 
2013 are chosen as the time length to minimize the possibility of distorted tweet contents 
caused by major events, such as breaking news, holidays or other extreme situations. 
                Six profiles are chosen as samples for analysis, three females and three males.  
The criteria for selecting opinion leaders on Weibo, based on their characteristics 
mentioned above, is mainly focused on how influential they are (the influentials).  The 
samples are selected based on considerations of: 1. The expertise field they belong to; 
2.The Rank of Influence data provided by Sina.com; and 3. The Top 100 Opinion Leader 
List provided by the Public Opinion & Communication Center of Fudan University and 
PubTopic.org in their Statistic Report (2011) and Report on Active Opinion Leaders on 
Weibo (2011) provided by Wuhan University. The sample consists three male and three 
female profiles for gender balance consideration. Also, all the profiles were verified 
profiles, which means the profile holders’ real identities and fields of expertise were all 
verified and displayed on their profiles.  
Sina.com publishes their Weibo data called Rank of Influence, which collects data 
about people’s Weibo profiles.  Weibo data also provides the equation for how they 
calculate the influence of a Weibo account:  
Influence = a x Activeness + b x Vagility + c x Coverage 
In this equation, a, b and c are the coefficients, but Weibo doesn’t publish the 
values of the coefficients.  Weibo data also published the explanation of each factor in the 
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equation:  
Activeness is how actively the user generates his/ her Weibo contents, which is 
determined by how many valid tweets, retweets and comments the user generates 
everyday. 
Vagility is how popular the information is, which is determined by how many 
valid times the tweets or retweets are being retweeted and commented on by valid users. 
Coverage is how far the information can reach, which is determined by how many 
active followers the Weibo account has.  
The Rank of Influence is calculated on a daily, weekly and monthly basis, in 
which the weekly and monthly Rank of Influence is based on the average value of the 
account’s daily Rank of Influence.  On the website, the previous data could be traced up 
to four weeks/six months.  
The Top 100 Opinion Leader List is released in the 2011 Research Report of 
Opinion Leaders on Weibo, and the Public Opinion & Communication Center of Fudan 
University and PubTopic.org explained that they utilized the Palas Public Opinion 
Monitoring System to determine the list; however, they didn’t provide much information 
about the details of the selecting process.  
The Report on Active Opinion Leaders on Weibo released by Wuhan University 
provide in-depth analysis based on 27 major online events during 2011, and listed the 
active profiles that took part in these events with considerations of the number of 
followers, how many events these profiles participated and the profiles’ number of 
tweets.  
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With the comprehensive consideration of the characteristics of opinion leaders on 
the Internet and current data and research reports, the samples information are listed 
below (data collected on 27 Nov. 2012): 
 
Table 1 
To balance the numbers of sampled tweets for each profile, 10 tweets were 
randomly selected each day from each profile. If a profile published less than 10 tweets a 
day, these tweets were all selected without randomization.  Based on the abovementioned 
standard, 297 tweets were generated for online observation and content analysis.  
Online Observation  
To answer RQ1 and RQ2, an online, non-participant observation will be 
Name on Weibo/ 
gender Expertise Field Followers Tweets 
Yao Chen 
(姚晨)/female Actress 26,368,030 6292 tweets 
Zhang Xin 
(张欣)/female 
CEO of SOHO China (real 
estate) 7,220,614 3308 tweets 
Lv Qiu Lu Wei 
(闾丘露薇)/ 
female 
Reporter; anchor for Phoenix 
Satellite Television 3,039,154 11505 tweets 
 
Li Kaifu 
(李开复)/male 
 
IT venture capitalist (the 
Innovation Works); computer 
scientist; high tech 
professional  
 
51,546,071  13796 tweets 
Zheng Yuanjie 
(郑渊洁)/ male 
Fairy tale author; sole writer 
for magazine King of Fairy 
Tales 
5,774,798 23406 tweets  
Qiuyi Taiwan 
(邱毅台湾)/male Political commentator  1,421,309 3369 tweets 
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conducted.  Online ethnography is often utilized in platforms such as blogs, chat rooms, 
forums, etc., (Carter, 2004; Hine, 2000; Lysloff, 2003) and microblog is also an 
applicable platform.  Although there have been debates about researchers’ physical 
absence of online ethnography, which is thought to hamper the careful and informed 
interaction between researchers and the subjects, Beneito-Moutagut (2011) contended 
that ethnography on the Internet has the advantage of centering on the subjects, and 
suggested that it’s a more fruitful methodology for exploring interpersonal relationships 
online.  
There will be no access problems for online observation, because their tweets are 
open to everyone on Weibo, as are their retweets and comments.  
 Observing opinion leaders’ activities online gives us primary answers about their 
activity patterns and habits.  This observation mainly focuses on: 1) in what ways do they 
receive and spread information on Weibo, and 2) what are these opinion leaders talking 
about on Weibo (i.e.: do they retweet from others? Or write original posts? Do they tag 
people? Do they make comments when they retweet?).  The general patterns of their 
behaviors on Weibo are very important for us to gather a holistic view of how opinion 
leaders use Weibo on a daily basis.  
Content Analysis  
Every text-based tweet, including retweets and comments are considered eligible 
for analysis.  When other forms of content, such as pictures, videos, gifs and links, the 
users descriptions were counted as eligible to be analyzed.  
Externally centered issue is operationalized as issues that are about a broader 
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sphere instead of directly self-related.  For example, topics about politics, public issues, 
economic and business and national and international affairs are considered externally 
centered.  While not externally centered issue is operationalized as more self-related 
issues, for example, one’s personal life, jobs, daily errands and activities, family, friends, 
relationships, emotions etc.  
The aggressiveness of the information is defined as the information that is 
negative, critical, sarcastic, or appealing for changes (even in subtle ways).  While non-
aggressive information is coded as supportive, neutral and/or non-radical, complimentary, 
sympathetic or non-critical and non-sarcastic.  
The popularity of a tweet on Weibo is defined:  1. By the number of comments a 
tweet generates; 2. By the number of times the tweet is retweeted; 3. By the times a tweet 
is “liked” by other people.  The more comments, retweets, “likes” and “collects” a tweet 
receives refers to higher popularity.  
A user’s expertise is defined by the field(s) the user’s current and previous 
occupancy is in.  In this research, the fields of expertise we look into are entertainment, 
finance and business, communication and media, high-tech and investment and literature.  
The field of expertise refers to career-based information, so tweets unrelated to jobs, 
careers and professions are considered outside of their fields of expertise. 
Interaction of the profile holders is operationalized as the times the holders reply 
their followers’ comments, and involve their followers into conversations. By counting 
the times they reply or @ (tag) their followers on their webpage.  
The researcher developed the codebook and the code sheet, and the researcher and 
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another bilingual graduate student acted as coders. Coding categories and questions were 
developed by the researcher to address specific questions. Intercoder reliability was 
performed on 30 tweets randomly extracted from the sample, which is more than 10% of 
the whole sample. The overall intercoder agreement between the two coders was 96.6% 
calculated by using Cohen’s kappa method. Disagreements were resolved by discussions 
and were used to refine and finalize the codebook and code sheet, and intercoder 
agreement data were added to the final database. Each coder did 50% of the remaining 
tweets.  
 A series of t-test were conducted to see if there were significant differences 
between male and female.  
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Chapter 4: Results 
 RQ1 and RQ2 focused on opinion leaders’ general communication patterns as 
well as the content of the information they prefer to communicate on Weibo. Figure 1 and 
Figure 2 show the results for online observation as to the opinion leaders’ usage 
behaviors on Weibo.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
  
D 
 
Figure 2 
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According to the data, most of the posted tweets were original, while opinion 
leaders also liked to retweet other users’ information and add their own opinions. 
Tagging people in the tweet was not very prevalent based on the online observation. 
 As to the question of what kind of information opinion leaders disseminated on 
Weibo (Figure 3), the observation revealed that the most popular category was public 
affairs and social issues, which comprised 39.7% of the whole sample. The second most 
popular category was the users’ jobs, work and daily errands (23.6%).  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
H1 predicted that there would be gender disparities in the externality of the issues 
raised by opinion leaders on Weibo. An independent-samples t test comparing the mean 
scores of male and female users on the externality of the tweets found a significant 
difference between males and females (t (295) = -3.68, p< .05). The mean for males was 
significantly lower (m=2.0859, sd=1.77) than the mean for females (m=3.91, sd=2.90). 
This confirms that male opinion leaders put much more emphasis on externally centered 
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  4%	   Culture	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Others	  6.7%	  This	  tweet	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  about…	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issues than female opinion leaders, while female opinion leaders are more likely to 
tweet/retweet non-external contents. 
 H2 predicted that there would be gender disparities in the aggressiveness of the 
tweets posted by opinion leaders. The independent t test found a strong difference 
between male and female opinion leaders on the aggressiveness of their tweets (t (295) = 
-3.32, p< .05). The mean for males was significantly lower (m=9.34, sd=1.77) than the 
mean for females (m=9.98, sd=1.31). This data reflects that male opinion leaders are 
significantly more aggressive than female opinion leaders on Weibo.  
H3 predicted that tweets within the users’ fields of expertise would be more 
popular than tweets on matters outside of the users’ fields of expertise. However, the data 
revealed a significant, opposite result (t (295)=-2.70, p < .05). 133 tweets were 
categorized as within the users’ fields of expertise, and 164 fell outside of the users’ 
fields of expertise. The mean for tweets within the fields of expertise was much lower 
(m=1916.74, sd=3407.93) than the mean for tweets outside of the fields of expertise 
(m=3712, sd=7028.58).  
 H4 concerned the relationship between fields of expertise and interactions. 
However, this hypothesis can neither be proven nor disapproved due to scarce data. It 
was found that the users rarely reply to followers’ comments on their accounts, regardless 
of the content of the tweets. The data on Mondays and Tuesdays showed that in 96 
tweets, 6 users only replied 13 times in total, while these tweets gained more than 90,000 
comments. The extremely low response rate provided inadequate data to examine the 
relationship between fields of expertise and interactions.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion and conclusion 
 This study fills the knowledge gap by identifying the opinion leaders’ ways of 
communication and generalizing the topics opinion leaders paid special attention to on a 
specific social media platform in China. The study also contributes to the literature by 
investigating how gender is correlated with how external the content of the tweets are and 
how aggressive the tweets are as well as how fields of expertise is related to the 
popularity of tweets.  
 The study gathered data on 6 opinion leaders from 6 different fields of expertise, 
and analyzed 297 tweets during two constructed weeks in January 2013. The researcher 
indicted the different ways opinion leaders use Weibo to communicate, and categorized 8 
different general areas of topics. This study found that 38% of the tweets were original, 
meaning opinion leaders mainly treated Weibo as a platform to express their original 
thoughts and feelings directly. Retweeting other people’s tweets and added their own 
comment was also a very popular way of using Weibo, and 33% of the tweets were 
posted in this form. The prevalence of this online behavior suggested that aside from 
purely original tweets, opinion leaders also consumed large flow of information on 
Weibo, and information consumption on Weibo is also a major factor that triggered them 
to not only retweet, but also digest and make comments.   
This study also categorized the general topics the opinion leaders talk about on 
Weibo. Public affairs and social issues is the most popular topic, while users’ jobs, work 
and daily errands is the second. However, politics only consisted 9.8% percent of the 
tweets. Opinion leaders, traditionally defined based on their authority and articulation in 
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politics (Lazarsfeld, 1944), expanded their ability to influence different groups on “every 
social and economic level” (Katz, 1955). Campus (2012) also believed that the advent of 
new media redirected the focus of attention on political opinions, and this study proved 
that opinion leaders in China did spent most of their time focusing on public affairs and 
social issues. Moreover, this paper found that opinion leaders in China not only treated 
Weibo as a place to influence others, but also a platform to write about their own life.  
Gender difference was also proven as a factor that may affect opinion leaders’ 
information consumption and communication on Weibo. This study shows a strong 
difference in the externality of the content of the tweets posted by male opinion leaders 
and female opinion leaders. Male opinion leaders, according to the data, were much more 
likely to discuss external issues. They are more likely to post information and news less 
related to their personal life, things that are influential on international, national or 
regional levels. However, female opinion leaders prefer to post things that are closer to 
their personal life, such as their work, daily errands, friends and family, pets, movies, 
travels, and even emotions and feelings, etc.  This finding is in line with Fuller (2004) 
that male Internet users centered more on external life, including politics, the government 
or commercial and financial information, while women report their opinions in politics, 
economy, foreign relations or taxes less frequently. Walker, Cohen and Sibbald’s study 
(2008) also proved that females are more willing to expose their private life on the 
Internet. The finding also supports Guiller and Durndell’s (2007) claims that females 
were more likely to integrate emotional forms of languages with high level of self-
disclosure than males online. By proving that there is a gender disparity in the externality 
	  35	  	  
of the tweets, this study implies that gender disparity in Internet use discussed in the 
previous literature is also applicable to the platform of microblog and Weibo, to be 
specific, and such gender disparity is also notable on Chinese opinion leaders.  
Gender is also associated with the aggressiveness of opinion leaders’ posts. The 
data confirms strong difference between the aggressiveness of male opinion leaders and 
female opinion leaders. Male opinion leaders are more likely to express aggressively, 
such as showing disagreement and argument, curing, swearing, scolding, condemning, 
using indecent words, or being sarcastic. They also post more negative information on 
Weibo, and showed more negative or aggressive feelings and emotions, such sadness, 
depress, hate, anger and indignation.  Female opinion leaders, on the contrary, are 
comparatively milder and gentler. They are more inclined to post less negative 
information, and are less likely to curse, swear and use extreme words. Although female 
opinion leaders also express their emotions and feelings, they tend to be more 
complimentary, encouraging and supportive, and they are more likely to offer advices 
than male opinion leaders. This finding supports Guiller and Gurndell’s (2007) study in 
gender patterns in online language use that females tended to use languages containing 
empathic utterances and express agreement and support, while men are more likely to 
express negatively with challenging and disagreeing information. This finding is also in 
line with studies in gender and linguistics. Tannen(1991) and Coates(1993) both argued 
that the male language use is built on competitiveness style while female is built on 
cooperativeness. It is also claimed that gender difference in learning process proved 
females prefer to learn connectively and cooperatively, however, males learns more 
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independently and argumentatively (Belenky, et al., 1997), which may explain why male 
opinion leaders in this study expressed more aggressive and negative information than 
female opinion leaders.  
 One of the interesting finding is that instead of showing growing popularity, 
tweets within the opinion leaders’ fields of expertise are actually less popular than fields 
outside of the opinion leaders’ fields of expertise. The data shows that tweets outside of 
the users’ fields of expertise attract much more comments, retweets and “likes” than 
those within the users’ fields of expertise, which conflicts with the previous literature 
claiming that source expertise can positively affect information retweeting (Liu, 2012). 
However, this might be the result of the objectives of this study. This study investigates 
the overall relationship between opinion leaders’ fields of expertise and tweet’s with 
random sampling that covers random topics ranging from various areas and fields. There 
might not be any extremely significant, or eye-catching event happened during the 
sampled period within the opinion leaders’ fields of expertise, while other issues or 
problems fall out of the chosen fields of expertise occurred and caught the opinion 
leaders’ and the followers’ attention. It may also because that since the sample is highly 
randomized; followers during the sample period were not looking for specific news or 
information that urgently need experts’ advice (for example, earthquake, disease, etc.). 
Opinion leaders’ long-term authority and trustworthiness in other occupational groups 
and issues may also contribute to the popularity of their tweets outside of their fields of 
expertise. Or, it is also possible that opinion leaders’ fields of expertise is in fact not 
significantly correlated with the popularity of their tweets in general.  
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This study also implies that not only opinion leaders have the ability to act as the 
“switchers” to control the information flow (Chadwick, 2008), they might also have the 
power and the influence to overturn the traditional agenda setting theory. According to 
Zhu (2014), microblog used to be a platform where the citizens (the grassroot group) 
dominants the formation of online public opinion, while the media did not have their 
privilege in setting up the agenda online. Such process de-centralized the information 
creation and dissemination online, and provided the grassroot group a comparatively 
“democratic” and “fair” public sphere to discuss public issues. However, such de-
centralized communication is gradually re-centralized again, especially with opinion 
leaders’ online participation, due to the competitive market where the ones with rich 
information resources gathers the more attentions online.  Such phenomenon became 
extremely prevalent, Zhu argued, that in the era when information was no longer an 
exclusive product on the Internet, the effectiveness of information communication online 
became the key. Therefore, those opinion leaders who have large number of followers 
and have already built the authority and trust among their followers has the ability to 
gather attentions, and affect large numbers of Internet users turned out to be the centers of 
public opinion online. This suggests that by effectively affecting public opinion online, 
opinion leaders may have the ability to affect media agenda. This implication is in line 
with studies claiming that there was evidence suggesting the pluralistic trend in public 
agenda setting, and that traditional media was no longer the universal source of 
information, while blogs and other online platforms began to influence media agenda 
setting, especially in the realm of politics and public issues (Lee et al., 2006; Meraz, 
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2009). Literature centered on Chinese media agenda setting situation also found 
traditional media’s agenda setting influence was declining, while the Internet start to play 
a role in setting up the public agenda (Qiang, 2007; Luo, 2012). Zhou and Moy’s (2007) 
study even found how online discussion could affect agenda setting: by escalating a 
small, local event into a big, national issue.  
 This study, however, addresses the media agenda setting issue from a different 
angle, and provides some suggestions and implications on how opinion leaders use the 
Internet, especially social media, to affect the online public discussion and potentially 
influence the public agenda, and even traditional media’s agenda setting. The ways 
opinion leaders communicate on Weibo reveals the possible means that they use to affect 
public opinion. The two most popular forms of tweets they posted were original tweets 
and retweets from other users with their own commentary. These results indicate that, to 
influence public opinion, and potentially affect media agenda setting, the two primary 
means used by opinion leaders are expressing their original thoughts, and adding new 
values (comments) to other people’s thoughts. By initiating discussions in these ways, 
opinion leaders might be able to introduce new ideas and values to existing events, and 
affect public opinion as well as media agenda setting (Zhou & Moy, 2007). In addition, 
opinion leaders online are most likely to affect online public agenda in public affairs and 
social issues, since these comprise the largest amount (39.7%) of their total tweets. At the 
same time, opinion leaders might also influence the public opinion in issues about their 
own professions, since jobs, work and daily errands comprise 23.6% of their total tweets. 
This study also found some gender disparities in opinion leaders’ use of Weibo, which 
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may imply that there are gender differences in how opinion leaders can affect the public 
agenda, and even media agenda setting. Male opinion leaders in this study were found to 
be more likely to focus on external issues, issues that are less relevant on a personal level, 
but are more influential on international or national levels. However, female opinion 
leaders were found to be more likely to tweet about non-external issues, issues that are 
more concerned with personal life.  Such findings may suggest a gender disparity in how 
opinion leaders affect the public agenda. Several possible indications include that male 
opinion leaders have more impact on political issues, public affairs, social issues, or other 
topics such as pollution, social injustice, poverty, wars and so on.  Therefore, male 
opinion leaders are probably more likely to affect the public agenda as well as media 
agenda in such fields.  By contrast, female opinion leaders spend more time discussing 
personally relevant topics, such as their family, friends, pets, entertainment, or their own 
occupations and daily work, which suggests that female opinion leaders may have more 
power in affecting the public agenda on topics such as family relationship, children and 
parenting, animal treatment and rights, popular culture and so on.  
Gender difference is also correlated with the aggressiveness of the tweets, as male 
opinion leaders showed much more aggressiveness than female opinion leaders.  This 
finding not only tells the level of aggressiveness in their tweets, it may also suggest a 
difference in how, and in what directions male and female opinion leaders could affect 
public opinion and media agenda. The study found that male opinion leaders tend to be 
more negative, critical and sarcastic and express more disagreement, while female 
opinion leaders are more likely to express support, compliments and encouragement. This 
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finding may also specify how male and female opinion leaders “guide” the public agenda 
differently, as male opinion leaders may affect the public agenda by presenting negative 
news and critical information, and possibly upsetting, thus leading online discussion to a 
more extreme end. Female opinion leaders, on the other hand, may exert more positive 
and optimistic influence on their followers, and may balance the public agenda by leading 
people to also express support, confidence and encouragement.   
Aside from gender disparities in opinion leaders, the negative correlation between 
opinion leaders’ fields of expertise and their tweets’ popularity also have valuable 
implications on agenda setting theory.  The findings suggest that, in general, the online 
public showed limited preference for opinion leaders’ fields of expertise; information that 
does not belong to opinion leaders’ fields of expertise are equally as popular, or even 
more popular than, the other.  Opinion leaders’ fields of expertise might only be 
significant when the online public is seeking very specific information, or needs highly 
professional, profound knowledge, such as seismology, astronautics, anthropology, etc.  
Therefore, this negative correlation implies that, as a general matter, opinion leaders 
might participate in public agenda setting and media agenda setting no matter what their 
fields of expertise are.  Their realm of influence exceeds their fields of expertise, and the 
online public showed great trustworthiness with respect to their opinions even though 
they may lack professional knowledge in the related fields.  
With existing literature showing that the Internet might also affect the public 
agenda and media agenda, findings in this study have several implications for how 
opinion leaders may affect the public agenda, and possibly media agenda.  The study also 
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has some interesting findings as to opinion leaders’ interactions with their followers.  
Although microblog served as a notable platform for online interaction, only 24% of the 
tweets showed obvious interaction (tag, known as “@”) between the opinion leaders and 
other users. This fact is also supported by opinion leaders’ extremely low response rate to 
the comments on their webpages as identified in H6.  The sampled 297 tweets generated 
213,160 comments, 606,359 retweets and 44,175 “likes” during two weeks, while the 
chance of interaction was found to be very small.  
Such obvious one-sided interaction may be explained by the concept of para-
social interaction. According to Horton and Wohl (1956), para-social interaction is an 
illusionary, one-way relationship between the audience and the performer where the 
audience anticipates an intimate relationship in their private life and interacts with the 
formers as close friends. Para-social interaction is “fictional”, “nondialectical” and 
“controlled by the performer” without susceptibility of mutual development. The concept 
of para-social interaction has been widely investigated on different media platforms, such 
as television and radio, and literature also expanded to see how such relationship exists 
among different groups. For example, the para-social relationship between citizens and 
political figures, readers and fictional characters, viewers and television hosts, soap opera 
starts and eve celebrities (Rubin & Perse, 1987, Stever, 2009). In this study, the 
interaction between followers and opinion leaders on Weibo fits within the concept of 
para-social relationship that the followers showed great interests and efforts to interact 
with opinion leaders, while such interaction lacks the input from opinion leaders. In fact, 
the existing literature had already touched the concept of para-social interaction within 
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the realm of opinion leader. Levy (1979) in his study found that more than 80% percent 
of respondents compared their own opinions to those raised by the commentators, which 
implies that sometimes performers on television may act like opinion leaders in such 
para-social interaction.  
This obvious para-social phenomenon raises some interesting suggestions and 
implications for the concept of gatekeeping in the new media era. The data in this study 
shows that massive numbers of followers not only pay close attention to opinion leaders’ 
behavior online, but also spend much time conducting one-way interactions with opinion 
leaders. This phenomenon may provide some hints about the gatekeeping process in the 
digital age. The previous gatekeeping process, as defined by Shoemaker et al. (2011), 
described how information is “winnowed, shaped and prodded” into published news by 
going through many editorial decisions, referred to as the “gates”. However, this old 
definition has been significantly challenged by the emergence of the Internet. Previous 
studies have shown that the traditional media’s gatekeeper role has been threatened and 
weakened in the online platform (Bowman & Willis, 2003; Gillmor, 2004), and many 
empirical studies have suggested that journalists and editors are accepting that they might 
not be the only gatekeepers anymore. For example, Cassidy (2006) found that almost half 
of the surveyed editors said they were spending less time on information verification 
when editing online. And studies centered on j-blogs also suggest that the role of 
journalists is changing; they are becoming more like gate watchers, sense-makers who 
accentuate journalistic values and ethics online, rather than traditional gatekeepers 
(Bruns, 2008; Singer, 2006). Internet users have been theorized to be alternative, or even 
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secondary gatekeepers online (Gao & Martin-Kratzer, 2011; Singer, 2013), and these 
Internet users, along with professional journalists and editors, together exercise the role 
of gatekeeper on the online platform. Such changes, according to many scholars, could 
bring advantageous changes. Yu (2011) argued that such changes offer a platform where 
ideas, visions, emotions and beliefs can be tested and applied in the online gatekeeping 
process. Some other scholars saw the value of the changing gatekeeping process 
especially in China, and argued that this changing gatekeeping process could lead to a 
more transparent and communicative platform for China, and increase public disclosure 
and enhance discussions to promote potential media and social changes (Yetaai, 2007; 
Gao & Martin-Kratzer, 2011; MacKinnon, 2008).  
Studies also suggest that opinion leaders, or similar online figures, have a great 
impact on the current gatekeeping process. Wu et al.’s (2011) study provided data 
suggesting less than 0.05% of users have control of almost 50% of all attention on 
Twitter, while Twitter users receive information from various of sources, of which mass 
media channels comprise only 15%. Meraz and Papacharissi (2013) also suggest that 
crowdsourced elites are the new gatekeepers who filter, collaborate, share and spread 
information on social media. Such findings all imply that opinion leaders online could 
exert great influence on what their followers would read, and how the information was 
tailored as news to be published and consumed by their followers. 
The findings in this study show that opinion leaders have enormous power to 
impact the public by simply publishing information online. The data shows that 297 
tweets studied in this research attracted 213,160 comments, 606,359 retweets and 44,175 
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“likes”, and each tweet gains 712 comments, 2042 retweets and 149 “likes” on average, 
while the numbers would be even larger if there were major events or issues that may 
affect the public, and if the subsequent commenting, retweeting and “likes” were 
calculated, expanding opinion leaders’ influence to an even larger audience. According to 
the findings, opinion leaders exercise their potential gatekeeper role in two major ways: 
publishing original content, or retweeting tweets they think are important while adding 
their own opinions. Among all these tweets, opinion leaders were most likely to gate keep 
information about public affairs and social issues, and of particular note, in the case of 
opinion leaders, the “gates” a piece of information needs to go through were more 
personal than professional; decisions were made individually, which differs from in the 
newsroom where a group of editors could discuss and decide. Besides, when they 
exercise their role of gatekeeper, they seldom communicate with their followers, too, 
based on their extreme low frequency of “tagging” people and replying to comments on 
their homepage. Thus, the gatekeeping process online for opinion leaders is more likely 
to be a one-sided process, where the decisions of how a piece of information should be 
shaped and tailored to meet the online community is almost solely based on opinion 
leaders’ personal decisions. Opinion leaders’ influence on public affairs and social issues 
could be much more amplified, not only because of the massive amount of followers who 
add these opinion leaders as their virtual “friends”, but also because they almost have 
total control over what information their followers will read, when their followers will 
read it and how the information will be packaged to be seen in the online community.  
This potential gatekeeping process on Weibo could also be further examined by 
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reference to gender differences. The gender differences in the externality of the issues 
and aggressiveness of the tweets implies that there may also be gender disparities in the 
possible gatekeeping process. This study found that male opinion leaders are more likely 
to mention external issues, issues that are less related to their personal lives and are more 
influential on international, national or regional levels. Female opinion leaders, on the 
other hand, are more inclined to post tweets about their personal life, issues that are 
centered on an individual level. This finding may present new implications for the 
concept of gatekeeping in the new media age, in that male and female gatekeepers might 
act differently when filtering and tailoring information. Male opinion leaders might be 
more likely to control information that is related to external issues, such as politics, 
environment, economy and finance, while female opinion leaders may be more likely to 
exercise their gatekeeper role when it comes to more personal topics, such as work, 
leisure life, entertainment, friends and family and so on. In addition, this study found that 
male opinion leaders were more aggressive than female opinion leaders; male opinion 
leaders are more likely to show disagreement and be argumentative or negative. Female 
opinion leaders, however, are more inclined to show agreement, support and 
encouragement, and be complimentary and optimistic. These differences in their tweets 
suggest that when practicing the role of gatekeeper, male and female opinion leaders have 
different preferences when winnowing, shaping and prodding information on the Internet 
(Shoemaker et al., 2011). Male opinion leaders prefer to shape the information into a 
more aggressive form, while females may prefer to shape messages with a more gentle 
tone. Therefore, followers who receive male opinion leaders’ information may develop a 
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more aggressive attitude toward the issues mentioned in the message, while those who 
consume messages disseminated by female opinion leaders may adopt a more positive 
and supportive stance towards the mentioned issues. Both the externality of the issues and 
the aggressiveness of the tweets that correlate with opinion leaders’ gender differences 
could potentially exert great impact on online public agenda. Male and female opinion 
leaders exercise their gatekeeper role differently, contributing different messages to the 
online community, and setting different public agendas online. Such disparities in the 
ways opinion leaders practice the gatekeeping process online could be advantageous in 
helping to build a healthy, democratic and pluralist online community. When opinion 
leaders take on the gatekeeper role, it might suggest a much healthier, democratic and 
pluralistic online community, in that opinion leaders could bring their own opinions, 
standards, values and ethics when deciding what to report and when to publish the 
information, rather than letting traditional media, who is under strict governmental 
censorship with unified values, ethics and codes of conduct, to filter the information. 
Such diversity makes the Internet, specifically social media, an extremely significant 
platform for media pluralism, in that it allows the public a comparatively free platform to 
consume diversified news and information, and discuss important social issues in a less 
controlled environment, which is hard to accomplish via traditional media. On Weibo, 
opinion leaders’ role as a gatekeeper has been different from the traditional gatekeeper; 
they have become the sense-makers of social events and issues with an open mind, the 
catalysts that incubate and encourage new ideas, values and controversies, and the 
propellers that accelerate the development of a more transparent media environment, and 
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more importantly, a more democratic society.  
The findings in this study also raise another interesting issue in the context of the 
Internet: who to listen to on the Internet, and why people trust these peoples’ agendas 
rather than other agendas. Opinion leaders, apparently, were popular sources people 
chose to pay attention to on Weibo, and the large numbers of comments, retweets and 
“likes” opinion leaders’ tweets gathered suggest that opinion leaders’ agendas were 
effectively communicated to large groups of people on the Internet, and more 
importantly, these agendas were transmitted to an even boarder audience by retweeting 
behaviors. Such selective process and agenda preferences might be explained by the 
concept of agenda melding (Shaw et al., 1999). The concept of agenda melding is based 
on the concept of cognitive dissonance. According to Leon Festinger (1957), cognitive 
dissonance is a drive inherent in human beings to avoid information that is against their 
attitudes and beliefs, and to seek information that is congruent with their views (also see 
Shaw et al., 1999). Building on this theory, Shaw et al. (1999) argued that the concept of 
cognitive dissonance implies that individuals have a driving force to seek the appropriate 
groups to belong to by “reducing dissonance between the agendas of these groups and the 
individual”. Shaw et al. (1999) accordingly investigated the agenda setting process from a 
cognitive dissonance perspective, and argued that in the context of social science, agenda 
setting could be described as a “social process of matching layers of priorities, issues and 
values in order to avoid the dissonance of being alone”, and this ongoing process is called 
agenda melding. In this vein, agenda setting is more like “an intervening part of the ways 
that individuals learn, in the broader social process of agenda melding”.  This process, 
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they claimed, is more important than how information is filtered and adopted, because it 
suggests a collective process for how individuals with similar attitudes and values 
automatically join the same group to “remove the dissonance of living in an environment 
of uninterested events”, and by joining a group, “one joins a way of interpreting events”. 
Agenda melding is necessary for individuals to reduce social dissonance, and to find the 
agendas that fit each other.  
The concept of agenda melding could provide some interesting insights on this 
study. The process that large groups of Internet users decided to follow an opinion leader, 
listen to them, and initiate para-social interactions with the opinion leader could be 
viewed as joining a group where the Internet users can share similar attitudes and values 
and avoid dissonance by omitting the information with which they disagree. Based on 
this concept, Internet users are probably not simply looking for news and information 
online, they are also seeking out those who share the same attitudes and values; they are 
not simply passively receiving information that is tailored by different media agendas 
online, they are actually actively seeking the online agendas that fit their views to 
“achieve a position or acceptance within social organizations”, and to avoid conflicting or 
inconsistent information (Shaw et al., 1999).   
Opinion leaders, in this study, may represent some very popular “groups” that 
attract individuals who share the same attitudes and values. Those followers appreciate 
opinion leaders’ agendas because these are the agendas they feel consonant with, and 
following opinion leaders and staying in the groups can help them to omit the information 
and the agendas they disagree with.  Such a sense of belonging is very powerful and 
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protective, and people in the groups were trying to convince newcomers to share the 
same values and beliefs (Krech et al., 1962; Shaw et al., 1999).  Followers’ commentary, 
retweeting and “like”-ing behavior, in the same context, could be explained as ways for 
them to convince their friends on Weibo. By commenting on tweets, retweeting and 
clicking “like”, followers are not only trying to interact with opinion leaders, they are 
trying to expand the agendas they believe in, and to enlarge the groups they are in.  
The findings in this study suggest that there may be diverse groups among 
opinion leaders too. The gender differences found in this study imply male and female 
opinion leaders have different groups concerned with different issues (external issues vs. 
non-external issues), attitudes (aggressive vs. not aggressive) and values. The negative 
correlation found between fields of expertise and popularity may suggest that these 
possible agenda groups are not necessarily built on opinion leaders’ fields of expertise, 
but on the overall agendas these opinion leaders exhibit. Internet users were looking for 
overall agreement with their views and values, rather than specific topics related or 
unrelated to opinion leaders’ fields of expertise. One Internet user may find the sense of 
belonging in many different groups to fit his/ her different values and attitudes, and some 
groups may even overlap on some specific issues. Opinion leaders on Weibo act like the 
group leader, or group identifier who are authoritative and influential enough to set the 
agendas in the groups with their own attitudes and values, and attract enough group 
members to share these attitudes and values.   
Although this study suggests that opinion leaders are exercising the roles of 
agenda setter and gatekeeper, it is tricky to define them as the agenda setter and 
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gatekeeper. In fact, it is very tricky even to call them the opinion leaders. These 
influential profiles studied in this research are surely very powerful in affecting other 
online individuals due to their large amount of followers and the numbers of comments, 
retweets and “likes” their tweets gathered. However, affecting others is not necessarily 
“advising” other people, and the realm of topics they mentioned on Weibo is far more 
than just politics. The online public pays attention to them, consumes the information 
they disseminate, however, not necessarily agree with them in many cases. The online 
public isn’t even seeking for advice in certain cases, but they take these profiles’ opinions 
seriously. Those profiles bring up issues, add their own opinions, publish them online, 
and people read them and generate their own opinions. Under such circumstance, they are 
more likely to be the “catalyst” rather than opinion leaders, agenda setters and 
gatekeepers. They help setting up the agenda by bringing up issues and opinions that the 
public cares and values, but the online public doesn’t rely on them to know what to think 
about since there are so many alternative ways to receive the information, and oftentimes, 
based on observation, their followers may disagree with the profiles on many issues. 
They are part of the agenda setting process in that they bring about the possible topics 
and agendas, but without the online public’s attention, there is no way that their agendas 
will be powerful enough to set the public agenda, and hence, traditional media’s agenda. 
Moreover, these influential profiles are not trying to They are also partly the gatekeepers 
in the sense that they filter and tailor the information their followers can read, but they 
are also not the solely part of the gatekeeping process; they are just the gatekeeper of 
their own, personal accounts instead of journalistic institutions, the online media or even 
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j-blogs. Their role of gatekeeper is exercised based on personal values and choices, and 
more importantly, they are not in completely control to decide what to report and how to 
report the information; when they retweet, they are re-tailoring the information that is 
winnowed by someone (or some journalistic or non-journalistic institutions) else already. 
They are probably not the opinion leaders according to the traditional definition; they are 
also not the agenda setters as well as gatekeepers by traditional means. However, they do 
partly exercise these roles by giving out information and affecting their followers on 
Weibo. Very few existing literature looked into these influential profiles on Weibo, and 
studies focused on their roles on social media are very limited, and this study implicates 
that these influential profiles on social media in China may have a unique role in 
affecting the public that is different from, but related to opinion leaders, agenda setters 
and gatekeepers.  
This study identified several patterns opinion leaders always use to communicate 
on Weibo, and significant correlations were found between gender, the externality of the 
issues mentioned and the aggressiveness of the tweets. Fields of expertise were found to 
be negatively correlated with the popularity of the tweets, and the sample provided scarce 
data to identify the relationship between fields of expertise and opinion leaders’ 
interaction frequency. The study has several implications. It investigated how previous 
and current theories on opinion leaders work in the new media environment, especially 
on social media. It also provides implications on agenda setting theory and the concept of 
gatekeeping as well as agenda melding in the digital age from a different perspective. It 
also provides some practical implications on how to understand opinion leaders’ 
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influence on social media as well as how they direct public agendas and opinions online.  
The study also gives rise to many possible future studies. Researchers may further 
explore how opinion leaders’ use Weibo, and seek more specific details about their usage 
patterns as well as potential correlations. For example, studies could look into how topics 
were related to opinion leaders’ gender and the popularity of tweets. Studies can also 
look into more aspects of tweeting style correlated with opinion leaders’ gender. For 
example, more studies can be done to see how gender is correlated with their behavior on 
certain topics, such as disasters, government corruption, human rights and so on, or how 
male and female opinion leaders’ online behaviors differ from each other when 
discussing the same topics. Scholars can also explore the reasons why field of expertise is 
negatively correlated with the popularity of the tweets, or explore how fields of expertise 
can affect opinion leaders’ communication efficacy on Weibo. Researchers can also 
expand the research on fitting opinion leaders into different theories and models, and 
investigate how opinion leaders are changing the traditional agenda setting model, how 
opinion leaders and traditional media set the agendas differently, or even how opinion 
leaders and traditional media interact together to set the media agendas and affect public 
agendas.  Studies can also probe how opinion leaders are changing the traditional 
gatekeeping concept, and see how opinion leaders are challenging the traditional 
gatekeeping concept on the Internet, or how opinion leaders are performing their 
gatekeeper role differently from traditional media and how this could affect the online 
public. Research can also look into how opinion leaders and the online public together 
affect the traditional gatekeeping process, or investigate how and why the online public 
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chooses to trust opinion leaders from a cognitive aspect. The potential para-social 
relationship discussed in this study also may merit further investigation, and scholars can 
explore how this para-social relationship is different from the para-social relationship 
found between television anchors, announcers, celebrities and their fans. Studies can also 
research the potential implicit interactions between opinion leaders and their followers 
online, or offline, and see how opinion leaders are listening to their followers in different 
ways. Studies can even investigate some specific situations where the public ceases to 
trust opinion leaders, and see how the relationship between opinion leaders and their 
followers change under different circumstances. In addition, these influential profiles 
unique role on social media in China is also an important topic for future research. 
This study identified several opinion leaders’ usage patterns on Weibo, and 
identified the popular topics in their tweets. By investigating how gender and field of 
expertise can affect opinion leaders’ microblog usage behavior and the popularity of their 
tweets, this study found that opinion leaders are active in writing their original tweets, 
and retweeting from other people with their own comments. Public affairs and social 
issues is the most popular topic on their webpages, while they also like to use Weibo for 
information about their jobs, work and daily errands. However, despite the fact that 
Weibo is featured for its interactivity, opinion leaders showed very few interactions with 
their followers. Field of expertise is also negatively related to the popularity of opinion 
leaders’ tweets. The study contributes to the current literatures by bringing new 
understanding to agenda setting theory, the concept of gatekeeping and agenda melding 
in the digital age, and the findings may help us better understand how opinion leaders in 
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China consume and communicate information on Weibo, from both qualitative and 
quantitative perspectives, and shed light on the influence of opinion leaders’ gender and 
fields of expertise on their communication behavior on Weibo.  
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Appendix 
I.	  Codebook	  1.	  User’s	  Name:	  	  2.	  The	  gender	  of	  the	  user:	  	  a.	  Male	  b.	  Female	  
RQ1&2:	  3.	  This	  tweet	  is:	  a.	  An	  original	  tweet	  b.	  A	  retweet	  only	  (from	  other	  people)	  c.	  A	  retweet	  with	  comments	  (from	  other	  people)	  d.	  A	  retweet	  from	  user’s	  previous	  tweet	  	  e.	  A	  retweet	  from	  user’s	  previous	  tweet	  with	  additional	  comments	  or	  information	  4.	  This	  tweet	  is	  about:	  a.	  News	  (both	  international	  &	  national)	  b.	  Public	  affairs,	  heated	  topics	  and	  issues	  c.	  Entertainment	  /	  sports	  d.	  Personal	  life	  and	  issues	  (work,	  family,	  friends,	  etc.)	  e.	  Others	  5.	  Does	  the	  user	  “@”	  (tag)	  anyone	  in	  his/	  her	  tweet?	  a.	  Yes	   	  b.	  No	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H1:	  6.	  The	  post	  mentioned:	  	  a.	  International	  issues,	  national	  issues	  or	  public	  related	  issues	  or	  news	  b.	  The	  users’	  personal	  life	  or	  issues,	  news	  and	  information	  	  c.	  Both	  a	  and	  b	  d.	  Others	  	  7.	  The	  post	  mentioned:	  	  a.	  Thing(s)	  that	  is	  (are)	  influential	  on	  international,	  national,	  provincial	  or	  regional	  levels	  b.	  Thing(s)	  that	  is	  (are)	  influential	  on	  the	  user’s	  personal	  level	  c.	  Both	  a	  and	  b	  d.	  Others	  8.	  Does	  the	  post	  mention	  anything	  about	  the	  user’s	  emotions,	  feelings,	  moods	  or	  psychological	  conditions?	  	  a.	  Yes	   	  b.	  No	  	  	  
H2:	  	  9.	  Does	  the	  user	  express	  or	  retweet	  criticism	  or	  negative	  information?	  a.	  Yes	   	  b.	  No	  10.	  Does	  the	  user	  express,	  or	  retweet	  sarcastic	  information?	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a.	  Yes	   	  b.	  No	  11.	  Does	  the	  user	  use	  aggressive	  words	  in	  his/	  her	  post,	  or	  retweet	  any	  post	  with	  aggressive	  words?	  a.	  Yes	   	  b.	  No	  12.	  Does	  the	  user	  express	  any	  negative,	  depressing	  feelings,	  emotions	  or	  unsatisfactory	  psychological	  conditions	  in	  his/	  her	  tweet	  or	  retweet?	  	  a.	  Yes	   	  b.	  No	  13.	  Does	  the	  user	  express	  any	  positive,	  complimentary	  information?	  a.	  Yes	   	  b.	  No	  14.	  Does	  the	  user	  offer	  any	  suggestions,	  advice	  and	  help?	  a.	  Yes	   	  b.	  No	  
H3:	  15.	  Does	  the	  post	  content	  related	  to	  user’s	  field	  of	  expertise?	  	  a.	  Yes	   	  b.	  No	  16.How	  many	  comments	  the	  tweet	  has?	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The	  number	  of	  the	  comments	  is:	  	  17.	  How	  many	  times	  the	  tweet	  is	  retweeted?	  The	  number	  of	  the	  times	  is:	  18.	  How	  many	  times	  the	  tweet	  is	  “liked”?	  	  The	  number	  of	  the	  times	  is:	  19.	  How	  many	  times	  the	  tweet	  is	  “collected（收藏）”?	  
The	  number	  of	  the	  times	  is:	  
H4:	  	  20.	  Does	  the	  post	  content	  belong	  to	  the	  user’s	  field	  of	  expertise	  or	  not?	  a.	  Yes	  b.	  No	  21.	  How	  many	  times	  does	  the	  user	  reply	  their	  tweet’s	  comments:	  The	  number	  of	  the	  times	  is:	  22.	  How	  many	  times	  the	  user	  @	  “tagged”	  people	  in	  his	  replies	  or	  the	  original	  post?	  The	  number	  of	  the	  times	  is:	  	  
 
